Peoples and states are treated differently by Rawls in the Law of Peoples than in A Theory of Justice, but does this extend to democracies?

There are reasons to reject Rawls' realistic utopia, and this post considers at least two of them.

Rawls believed outlaw states had no reason to acquire nuclear weapons if superpowers could suppress their desire for them. Rawls is wrong.

Rawls argues that countries should leap to the defence of another country but is forbidden from instigating war. What justifies this?

Mackie's epistemological argument from queerness presupposes that objective values are not influential. I argue that Mackie rejects that.

If Mackie's epistemological argument from queerness is correct, then epistemic access to objective value is possible.

Michael Lynch argues for truth's objectivity early in his (2004), and I challenge that argument here.

John Rawls' justice as fairness was based upon principles discovered by persons behind a veil of ignorance. Does the VOI eliminate desires?

People tend to overlook instances of sex as rape because of their preconceived ideas. Here, I argue that pornography is rape.

In this post, I present two arguments that motivate an interest in seeing logical psychologism rehabilitated.

Quinean paraphrase is one of the best exemplifications of conceptual analysis.

Complete ignorance of others' rules and policies is implausible; we infer their rules and policies from their behaviour.

Alan Millar distinguishes between motivating and normative reasons, but is the distinction as clear-cut as many have believed it to be?

A version of the trolley vignette can elicit the opposite reaction to the dilemma, i.e., sacrifice the five to save the one.

Is Jackson's modest role of conceptual analysis any better than the immodest role?

A summary of types of emailers: relaxed, driven, and stressed.

Thinking blindspots are aggravating because they take our focus away from important matters and clues that could lead to alternative ends.

A quick note on the nature of scientific progress and getting closer to the truth.

Tarski's theory of truth has been thought to be a definition of truth without giving an explanation of it; here, I take that to task.

Russell contended that non-denoting phrases were problematic because of scope ambiguity; in this post, I challenge that view.

Pollock and Cruz criticise Lehrer's holistic theory of coherence justification. In this post, I offer a defence of Lehrer's position.

Jürgen Habermas has claimed that narrative shouldn't replace argument in philosophy but that narrative is philosophy.

John Locke argued that substance was something (he knows not what) but that underlies all reality. I explore this issue in the post.

Is weakness of will possible? In this post, I consider Davidson's argument for the possibility of weakness of will.